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INTRODUCTION

No issue in modem products liability law is more important, or more
inscrutable, than the doctrine of federal preemption. The doctrine is important
because the defense of federal preemption in recent years has grown from little
more than a blip on the radar screen to one of the most powerful defenses in all
ofproducts liability law. The doctrine is inscrutable because it is a formless and
elusive creature, based on ephemeral notions of federalism and the oft-obscure
intent of Congress, that vacillate according to shifting political sentiments-on
federal versus states rights, on Congress versus the courts, and on regulatory
versus products liability law.' Despite the best efforts of courts and
commentators to bring order to the chaos,2 the law on federal preemption has
obstinately refused to set anchor in enduring principles. Instead, it continues to

1. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 229 (2000) (noting that "the
politics of preemption are complicated"); Scott A. Smith & Duana Grage, FederalPreemption
of State ProductsLiability Actions, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 391,415 (2000) (predicting that
"the preemption defense is almost certain to remain highly politicized"); David B. Spence & Paula
Murray, The Law, Economics, andPoliticsofFederalPreemptionJurisprudence:A Quantitative
Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (1999) (stating, "For most judges, whether liberal or
conservative, these cases pit one dimension of their ideology, their principles of federalism,
against another, their policy preferences or attitudes toward the particular local regulation at
issue."). See generallyJOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONALLAW § § 9.1 -.4
(6th ed. 2000) (discussing federal preemption and its development); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-28 to -33 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the relationship

between state law and federal legislation).
2. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, FederalPreemptionofState ProductsLiabilityDoctrines,
44 S.C. L. REV. 187 (1993) [hereinafter Ausness, Federal Preemption];Richard C. Ausness,
Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption
JurisprudenceSince Cipollone, 92 KY. L. J. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Ausness, Preemption
Jurisprudence];Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, CongressionalIntent, and Conflict of Laws
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Davis, On Preemption];Mary J. Davis,
Unmasking the Presumptionin Favorof Preemption,53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002); Viet D. Dinh,
Reassessing the Law of Preemption,88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress
Speak Clearly:FederalPreemptionof State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997); Robert
B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The PreemptionPentad: FederalPreemptionof ProductsLiability
Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691 (1997); M. Stuart Madden, FederalPreemption
ofInconsistentState Safety Obligations,21 PACE L. REV. 103 (2000); Nelson, supranote 1; Lars
Noah, Reconceptualizing FederalPreemption of Tort Claims As the Government Standards
Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903 (1996); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory
Compliance,88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); Susan Raeker-Jordan,A Study in JudicalSleight ofHand:
Did Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the PresumptionAgainst Preemption?, 17
BYUJ. PUB. L. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Raeker-Jordan, Sleight ofHand]; Susan Raeker-Jordan, The
Pre-EmptionPresumption That Never Was: Pre-EmptionDoctrineSwallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1379 (1998) [hereinafter Raeker-Jordan, Pre-EmptionPresumption];Marin R. Scordato,
FederalPreemptionofState Tort Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2001); Smith & Grage,supra
note 1.See generally4 LOuis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § § 24.01.05 (2003); 2 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL, MADDEN& OWEN ON PRODUCTSLIABILITY §§ 28:1-8 (3d
ed. 2000); 2 PRODUCTS LIAB. REP. (CCH) 2810 (2001).
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wallow in a state of utter chaos--"ad hoc, unprincipled... , seemingly bereft
of any consistent doctrinal basis,".3 "a muddle, "inexplicable, ' "opaque, '
"confusing and chaotic," 7 "terrible,"'8 "indetermina[te]," 9 and "in a state of
'
disarray"'°-quite simply, in a "mess."" I
Federal preemption is an affirmative defense, subject to waiver, on which
the defendant has the burden of proof.'2 The federal preemption defense arises,
and a products liability claim is foreclosed, when the claim somehow conflicts
with a federal product safety statute or regulation specifying design, marketing,
or manufacturing standards. When enacting product safety legislation,
Congress normally vests regulatory authority over the matter in a federal
administrative agency, often specifying in a preemption clause that state law
may not interfere with safety standards or "requirements" in the statute itself or,
more typically, as promulgated by the federal agency. Whether or not Congress
in any particular statute expressly prohibits the states from interfering with
implementation of the legislation, any state law that infact interferes with the
operation of a federal statute or regulation thereunder contravenes the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. This clause provides that
federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
in the Constitution or Laws of any
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
'
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 13

3. William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalismand the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 624 (1975).
4. Nelson, supra note 1,at 232.
5. Smith & Grage, supra note 1,at 415.
6. Davis, On Preemption,supra note 2, manuscript at 5.
7. Smith & Grage, supra note 1, at 392.
8. Ausness, Preemption Jurisprudence,supra note 2, manuscript at 3.
9. Dinh, supra note 2, at 2085.
10. Scordato, supra note 2, at 7. See also Raeker-Jordan, Sleight ofHand,supra note 2, at
33 (stating preemption doctrine is "still in disarray").
11. Dinh, supra note 2, at 2085.
12. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244,256 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating
that preemption is an affirmative defense on which defendant has burden of proof); Williams v.
Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 593 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing preemption and Rule 8(c),
which requires pleading certain defenses); Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 136 F. Supp.
2d 196, 199-200 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting, however, that a statement in the answer that the
product met government standards may suffice). See also Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244
F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding summaryjudgment for defendant on the ground that plaintiff's
claims were preempted). Hence, a defendant who fails to assert preemption in a timely manner
may waive the defense. See, e.g., Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62 F.3d 8, 10-12
(1st Cir. 1995) (holding that although preemption was pleaded in defendant's answer, defendant
did not raise the defense substantively until after adverse verdict); Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp.,
899 P.2d 576,581-83 (N.M. 1995) (holding that federal preemption is waived ifnot raised before
end of trial).
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
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State statutes and administrative regulations are of course governed by the
Supremacy Clause, but so too are products liability actions which can interfere,
if less directly, with the administration of a federal safety statute. "[R]egulation
can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some
form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed
is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy."' 4 Thus, a products liability claim is preempted if it is prohibited by or
conflicts in some way with a federal statute or regulation. 5 In determining
whether a products liability claim conflicts with federal law, courts must
interpret the statute to ascertain its aims. "'The purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone"' in every preemption case. 6 Put otherwise, statutory
construction is the cornerstone of preemption analysis.' 7
In general, federal courts are more willing than state courts to find
preemption. State courts normally are more focused on protecting the right to
compensation of their citizens harmed by the unlawful behavior of others (a
right often protected by state constitutions), whereas federal courts of limited
jurisdiction generally are more concerned about the doctrine of federal
supremacy."
A.

Types ofPreemption

Federal preemption of state law may be "express" or "implied." That is,
preemption "is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in
9
the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."'
Express preemption may helpfully be viewed as textual, in contrast to implied
preemption, which may be thought of as contextual.2 ° What this means is that
express preemption is discernable from the explicit language of a federal
statute, whereas implied preemption must be deduced from the broader

14. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
15. Federal administrative agencies may be authorized to preempt state law by regulation.
Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707,713 (1985) ("[S]tate
laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes."). See also

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 505 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that
"administrative agenc[ies] possess[ ] adegree of leeway to determine which rules, regulations or
other administrative actions will have pre-emptive effect").
16. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (quoting AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,208 (1985)).
17. SeeNOWAK&ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 348; TRIBE, supranote 1,§ 6-28, at 1176-79.

18. See Smith &Grage, supra note 1, at 412.

19. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). See also Medtronic, 518 U.S. at
486 (explaining that the structure and purpose of the statute is relevant indetermining Congress'
intent).
20. Madden, supra note 2,at 106.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss2/8
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purposes of a statute-whether or not it contains an express preemption
clause.2 '
1. Express Preemption
Congress by statute may expressly preempt state law with a preemption
clause that explicitly states the statute's preemptive scope-the extent to which
it precludes state law.22 In legislation regulating product safety, enacted mostly
in the late 1960s, Congress was less concerned with the effects of common-law
damages claims in products liability cases than with the possibility that state
statutes or administrative regulations might somehow undermine the federal
legislation. 23 Accordingly, as discussed below, preemption clauses in federal
statutes typically provide that the states may not adopt conflicting
"requirements" or "standards." Phrasing of this sort has raised the question of
whether the words "requirements" and "standards" mean only legislative and
regulatory requirements and standards, or whether Congress intended these
terms more broadly to include judicial rulings on common-law damages claims.
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court has ruled definitively that these
phrases in preemption clauses can indeed preclude products liability judgments
as well as the more obvious and direct kind of state action through legislation
and regulation by administrative agencies. Accordingly, to the extent that
allowing a products liability claim would establish a form of common-law
safety standard different from that imposed by federal law, an express
preemption clause may preclude the claim.
Two types of clauses are particularly relevant in determining whether a
statute expressly preempts a state-law products liability claim, preemption
clauses, and savings clauses. A "preemption clause" describes the extent to
which a statute precludes the application of state law, and a "savings clause"
provides that compliance with the statute does not exempt a person from
liability under state common law. These two provisions thus generally point in
opposite directions: preemption clauses tend to deny, and savings clauses tend
to allow, state-law products liability claims. Normally, therefore, the express
preemption issue should be clearer if a federal safety statute has only a

21. See id.
22. State law is expressly preempted "[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue,
and when that provision provides a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state
authority ...
' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (quoting Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)).
23. See, e.g., Leflar & Adler, supra note 2, at 746-48 (indicating that Congress added

preemption language to federal statutes to displace inconsistent state legislation).
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preemption clause24 or only a savings clause.25 Preemption determinations are
complicated in statutes that contain neither type of clause, and thus are silent
27
on the matter, 26 and in statutes that contain both types of clauses, and so
appear internally conflicted.

2. Implied Preemption
Even if a federal statute is silent with respect to the preemption issue, a
products liability claim may be foreclosed by the doctrine of implied
preemption. There are two forms of implied preemption, "implied field

preemption" and "implied conflict preemption." Impliedfield preemption arises
if (a) federal regulation of a field is so complete and "so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it,"'28 or (b) Congress legislates in a field in which "the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed to preclude
29
enforcement of state laws on the same subject., Implied conflict preemption
arises if (a) federal and state provisions directly conflict, making it impossible
3°
to comply with both requirements, or (b) state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'" Thus, even if a federal product safety statute does not contain a
clause expressly preempting damages claims under state law, the statute still
may impliedly preempt such claims.32

24. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136v
(2002). See discussion infra Part II.
25. See Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2000). See
discussion infra Part IV.D.2. However, a federal agency (such as OSHA) may, by regulation,
preempt state law with respect to particular matters.
26. See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). See discussion infra Part
IV.B. Like OSHA, however, the FDA expressly preempts state law on certain issues.
27. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,49 U.S.C. § 30103(b), (e)
(2000). See discussion infra Part IV.A.
28. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
29. Id.
30. See generallyLouise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict ofLaws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1753-54 (1992) (describing "actual" conflict preemption).
31. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941). See also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,
649 (1971) (quoting Hines in discussing the meaning of the Supremacy Clause). This last form
of conflict preemption is often aptly termed "obstacle" or "frustration-of-purpose" preemption.
In addition to the conventional divisions, implied preemption also may result from federal
common law and from the "dormant" commerce clause. See Dinh, supra note 2, at 2109-12.
32. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001); Geier
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,869 (2000) (explaining that although the savings clause
removes tort actions from the scope of express preemption, it does not foreclose implied
preemption).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss2/8
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B. The PresumptionAgainst Preemption
Principles of federalism command congressional respect for the
sovereignty of the states,33 including their authority to render damages
judgments in products liability and other litigation. In the words of the Supreme
Court, "because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we
have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes
' From
of action."34
this premise, the Court has relied upon an "assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [a] Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress., 35 At bottom,
this "presumption against preemption" rests on the precept that the Constitution
constrains the federal government, the powers of which are limited and
specifically enumerated, from trampling on the reserved powers of the states.36
In the first two products liability preemption cases, the Court interpreted
the federal product safety statutes against this backdrop assumption that
disfavored preemption.37 Recently, however, the Court has moved away from
the presumption against preemption, noting its inapplicability when the matter
regulated implicates federal interests as much or more than matters traditionally
addressed by state law.3" As the Supreme Court has strayed from its former
regard for the presumption against preemption, commentators have increasingly
questioned the meaning, strength, and legitimacy of any such presumption.3 9
It is true, of course, that Congress should be guided by principles of
federalism in enacting legislation on health and safety, subjects that
traditionally have resided largely under state control. However, if Congress has
authority under the Commerce Clause to enact particular legislation regulating
33. See Dinh, supra note 2, at 2085-86.
34. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).

35. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See generally TRIBE, supra
note 1, § 6-28, at 1175 (discussing federal preemption of state action).
36. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111-12 (1992) (Kennedy,

J., concurring) (discussing state workplace safety standards challenged as preempted under
OSHA). Justice Kennedy concurred only in the result because he believed the plurality's broad

resort to implied preemption principles contradicted "two basic principles of our pre-emption
jurisprudence. First, we begin 'with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superseded... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'
Second, 'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in all pre-emption cases." Id. at 111
(citations omitted).
37. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516
(1992). See generally Dinh, supra note 2, at 2085-86 (indicating that presumption against
preemption was generally accepted).

38. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2000) (ruling on statute
that regulates fraud on a federal agency); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 337 U.S. 51 (2002)
(ruling on statute that regulates boat safety, traditionally the domain of the Coast Guard).
39. See Davis, supranote 2; Dinh, supra note 2; Raeker-Jordon, Pre-EmptionPresumption,
supra note 2, at 1418; Raeker-Jordan, Sleight ofHand, supra note 2; Scordato, supra note 2, at
29-32.
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health and safety, then the Supremacy Clause might seem to certify,
automatically, the legitimacy of this federal incursion into a domain normally
controlled by the states. If this view is correct, then the responsibility of courts
is merely to interpret such a statute, untrammeled by any presumption for or
against preemption, to determine whether and to what extent Congress intended
to restrict common-law claims.'
Rather than being an independent principle of federalism, therefore, the
doctrine of federal preemption might more accurately be viewed as a doctrine
governing the interpretation of legislation which itself should be animated and
bounded by principles of federalism embedded in the Commerce Clause." Put
another way, principles of federalism may help determine whether a federal
statute is proper under the Commerce Clause, but if a statute is proper under the
Commerce Clause, the statute properly occupies whatever space might
otherwise have been occupied by state law and so is not further subject to
challenge on federalism grounds. That said, however, where exactly principles
of federalism may lie within the Constitution may be less important than the
fact that such principles do oblige the Congress, when considering legislation
on matters of health and safety, to respect the traditional sovereignty of the
states. So, if federal legislation on product safety does not clearly state whether
products liability claims under state law are prohibited or permitted, and if such
claims do not truly conflict with federal regulation, Congress should be deemed
to have intended to leave unmolested traditional state control over matters in
this realm.42 Whether or not a "presumption against preemption" is the best way
to articulate this kind of backdrop deference that Congress and the federal
courts should exhibit when they operate in a field traditionally ruled by the
states, the presumption idea captures important structural truths about the
republic that reside somewhere in the Constitution.
II.

STIRRINGS OF PREEMPTION-PESTICIDES AND INSECTICIDES

Rooted in statutory construction, the federal preemption defense rests upon
a determination that Congress in a particular statute intended to preclude
particular products liability claims. The preemption issue thus is both statutespecific and claim-specific, meaning that the resolution of this issue is governed
in any given case by an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the particular

40. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 6-28, at 1177 ("Perhaps, the most fundamental point to remember is that preemption analysis is, or at least should be, a matter of precise statutory
construction rather than an exercise in free-form judicial policymaking."). But see id. at 1195
n.74.
41. See generally Dinh, supra note 2, at 2088-91 (stating that "the authority for the preemption provision must come from either the Commerce Clause alone or perhaps the Commerce

Clause with a helping hand from the Necessary and Proper Clause").
42. See, e.g., Raeker-Jordan, Pre-EmptionPresumption,supra note 2, at 1468-69.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss2/8
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federal statute in relation to particular products liability claims.43 While
preemption analysis in every case will therefore turn on the meaning and
purposes of a specific statute-as revealed by its express provisions, its
structure, and its legislative history"-the basic issue in every case remains the
same: whether Congress intended, expressly or implicitly, to prohibit products
liability claims of the type asserted by the plaintiff. Because the preemption
doctrine has thus evolved on a statute-specific basis,45 the preemption defense
in products liability litigation is helpfully informed by an examination of the
doctrine's development over time as the courts have investigated the
preemptive effect of particular federal statutes regulating the safety of particular

types of products.
Prior to the Supreme Court's initial foray into the application of
preemption doctrine to products liability law in 1992," federal preemption
rarely figured seriously in this type of litigation. Indeed, prior to this time, the
Supreme Court had decided only a handful of preemption cases involving
common-law damages claims ofany type.47 During the 1980s, as manufacturers
scrambled for ways to avoid the rigors of products liability judgments, they
increasingly asserted the preemption defense. 4 In part because of the Supreme
Court's skeptical attitude at the time toward the preemption of state tort-law
claims,49 assertions of the preemption defense during most of this decade
generally fell on deaf judicial ears.5"

43. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 2, at 2092-97 (discussing preemption as statutory construction); Scordato, supra note 2, at 31 (providing two versions of a hypothetical regulation and
discussing the interpretation and outcome of each).
44. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (remarking that courts must
look to the structure and purpose of a statute as a whole "as revealed not only in the text, but
through the reviewing court's reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the
statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law"); Gade
v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (explaining that the "ultimate task
in any pre-emption case is to determine whether state regulation is consistent with the structure
and purpose of the statute as a whole"); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,621 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]e should try to give the text its fair meaning, whatever various
committees might have had to say-thereby affirming... that we are a Government of laws, not
ofcommittee reports."). See generallyAusness, supranote 2, at 240-52 (explaining methodology
for interpreting federal regulations by evaluating text, history, and legislative policy).
45. See, e.g., Dinh, supranote 2, at 2085 ("[T]he Court's preemption decisions necessarily
vary across the different statutory schemes at issue.").
46. The first products liability preemption case was Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992), infra Part III.
47. Davis, supra note 2, at 969 n.9.
48. Id. at 998.
49. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (ruling that a plutoniumcontamination claim by worker at nuclear power plant was not preempted by Atomic Energy Act).
Silkwood is examined in Davis, supra note 2, at 990-94.
50. See Davis, supra note 2, at 998 ("[D]efendants had rarely been successful in arguing
that the existence of a federal statutory standard totally preempted the plaintiffs state law based
allegations of defectiveness or negligence."). See generallyAusness, FederalPreemption,supra
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The first reported decision concerning the preemptive effect of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) was Ferebeev. Chevron
Chemical Co.5' This prominent decision by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit involved a products liability claim against the
distributor of a herbicide, Paraquat, on behalf of an agricultural worker who
52
allegedly died from breathing and contacting the herbicide. In FIFRA,
Congress established a comprehensive regulatory scheme administered by the
EPA for registering and labeling pesticides, insecticides, herbicides, and other
toxic products.53 Under the Act, a manufacturer must submit proposed labels
to the EPA to assure that they are "adequate to protect health and the
54
environment" and "likely to be read and understood." FIFRA expressly
prohibits the states from imposing any "requirements for labeling or packaging
55
in addition to or different from those required" under the Act's provisions.
In Ferebee,the plaintiff claimed that the label warnings on Paraquat were
inadequate and caused the decedent's death, and the jury agreed. Rejecting the
defendant's federal preemption arguments, the court concluded that the Act did
not expressly preclude state common-law actions, nor did implied field or
conflict preemption apply. Although a damages award for inadequate warnings
might impose a dual obligation on the defendant, the court concluded that the
defendant could comply with both federal and state law by using the EPAinsufficient warnings as
approved warning labels while paying damages5 for
6
judgment.
liability
products
required by the state
Although a growing number of decisions ruled against plaintiffs on the
preemption issue, 5 most courts through the 1980s and early 1990s followed the
s
Ferebee approach in holding that neither FIFRA nor other federal safety

note 2, at 191,200-34 (examining case law applying preemption principles and concluding that
most courts ignore important policy issues by applying a one-dimensional approach to preemption

issues).
51. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

52. See generally Madden, supra note 2, at 120-28 (explaining Ferebee and case law
following or rejecting Ferebee).
53. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2000).
54. See id. at §§ 136(q)(l)(F), 136(q)(1)(E).
55. Id. at § 136v(b).
56. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540-41.
57. See, e.g., Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (1 th Cir. 1991) (impliedly preempted),
vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), remanded to 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993) (expressly
preempted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 (1993); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (FIFRA); Taylor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1989) (noairbag claim).
58. See, e.g., Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339 (D.
Mont. 1991); Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Evenson v. Osmose
Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704
1988).
F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ill.
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statutes59 preempted products liability claims. Yet, once the Supreme Court in
1992 energized the federal preemption defense in products liability litigation,
as discussed below, the lower courts began to rethink the role of preemption
under federal statutes such as FIFRA. In recent years, the decisions have turned
sharply in the other direction. In cases where a manufacturer has complied with
an EPA-required warning under FIFRA, the courts now are nearly unanimous 0
in holding that the Act preempts at least tort-law 6 warnings claims, the most
common type of FIFRA claim. 62 However, the courts are generally in accord

59. See, e.g., Abbot v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1111-13 (4th Cir. 1988)
(involving neurological injuries from inoculation of DTP vaccine manufactured by defendant
where court held no express preemption by Public Health Service Act or Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, nor any implied preemption because common-law vaccine claims do not frustrate
federal statutory goals); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass. 1985)
(compliance with FDA labeling requirements on birth control pills-no preemption).
60. ContraSleath v. West Mont Home Health Services, 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000) (holding
that FIFRA does not preempt warnings claims). In Sleath, the court relied heavily on an amicus
curiae brief that the EPA filed in Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv., Inc., 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000).
Sleath, 16 P.3d at 1050. In that brief, the EPA took the position that FIFRA does not preempt any
state-law theories of liability, including failure to warn claims that implicate pesticide labels. Id.
The Montana Supreme Court granted deference to the EPA's view because it is the agency
responsible for administering FIFRA. Id. at 1048-49. Other courts have declined to grant the EPA
deference, holding that the plain terms of 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) expressly preempt state-law claims
based on the failure to warn. See, e.g., Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895 (8th Cir.
2002) (holding that FIFRA preempts damage claims associated with certain pesticides);
Etcheverry, 993 P.2d 366 (finding that state law failure to warn claims are preempted by FIFRA);
Eyl v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 650 N.W.2d 744 (Neb. 2002) ("We determine that Eyl's common-law
failure-to-warn claims are labeling based and preempted by FIFRA").
61. Most courts also bar warranty and misrepresentation claims ifbased on an EPA-required
warning. See, e.g., Andrus v. AgrEvo USA Co., 178 F.3d 395, 396 (5th Cir. 1999); Nat'l Bank
of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1999); Grenier v. Vermont Log
Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1996). Contra,Arnold v. Dow Chem. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr.
2d 722, 740 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing cases holding that implied warranty claims are not
preempted); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 819 (Minn. 2000) (holding that FIFRA does
not preempt negligent misrepresentation or negligent testing claims).
Courts addressing claims based on off-label statements generally hold that such claims are
not preempted if the statement differs from the label, but that such claims are preempted if the
statements merely reiterate language on the label. See, e.g., Dillon v. Zeneca Corp., 42 P.3d 598,
601-02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that FIFRA preempts claims based on off-label
statements that merely reiterate language on label); Sun Valley Packing v. Consep, Inc., 114 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 237, 239 (Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that FIFRA does not preempt implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose claim based on off-label statements about matters outside scope of
required label); Diehl v. Polo Coop. Ass'n, 766 N.E.2d 317, 322 (111. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that
FIFRA does not preempt claims based on off-label recommendations that differ from label).
62. See, e.g., Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 313 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2002);
Netland, 284 F.3d 895; Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 1999); Nat'l
Bank of Commerce, 165 F.3d 602; Kuiper v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 131 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1997);
Grenier,96 F.3d 559; Etcheverry, 993 P.2d 366 (citing cases); Arnold, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722;
Eyl, 650 N.W.2d 744 (citing cases); Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967 (N.J. 1998). But
cf Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Ind. 2001) (holding that FIFRA does not
preempt claim that pest control applicator negligently failed to convey to pesticide's ultimate user
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that FIFRA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts claims that pertain to
matters not regulated by the EPA, such as claims that truly are not based on
labeling but on the defectiveness of the pesticide's design, packaging, or
manufacture.6 3
I. PREEMPTION'S ARRIVAL-CIPOLLONE
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.," the Supreme Court in 1992 for the
6
first time applied federal preemption doctrine to a products liability case. ,
Cipollonewas an action against three cigarette manufacturers on behalfof Rose

Cipollone who died of lung cancer after smoking the defendants' cigarettes
from 1942 to 1984. The products liability claims included design defectiveness;
failure to provide adequate warnings; negligent research, testing, and

information found on required label).
63. See, e.g., Hawkins, 184 F.3d 244 (gaseous fumes from chlorinator tablets used in pools;
packaging claims not preempted); Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 165 F.3d at 609 ("defectively
manufactured or designed products properly labeled under FIFRA may still be subject to state
regulation, in the form of common law or other claims"); Southern States Coop. Inc., v. I.S.P. Co.,
Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 807 (N.D. W. Va. 2002) (ruling that FIFRA does not preempt claim that
horse feed was adulterated with rat poison); Arnold, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (concluding that true
design claims are not preempted); Sally Baghdasarian, Recent Case, Arnold v. Dow Chem. Co.,
110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (Ct. App. 2001), 31 Sw. U. L. REv. 441 (2002) (reviewing recent
preemption decisions); Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 617 (S.D. W. Va. 2001)
(ruling design defect claims not preempted); Ackerman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d 208,
215 (Iowa 1998) (holding plaintiffs negligent design and testing claims not preempted). But see
Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that FIFRA preempts
breach of express warranty claim and warnings claims "disguised" as defective design and
negligent testing claims); Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding
that FIFRA preempts manufacturing defect and design defect claims that were factually premised
on inadequate labeling); Johnson v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 129 F. Supp. 2d 189, 195 (N.D.N.Y.
200 1) ("Claims of misdesign or mismanufacture which the Court regards as thinly veiled labeling
or failure to warn claims will not stand."); Traube v. Freund, 775 N.E.2d 212 (111. App. Ct. 2002)
(holding that FIFRA preempts nuisance and ultra-hazardous activity claims based on allegedly
deficient label); Eriksen v. Mobay Corp., 41 P.3d 488 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (ruling that
consumer expectations design defect claim was effectively a warnings claim).
Courts disagree on whether FIFRA preempts claims based on a product's efficacy-whether
a herbicide harms rather than helps a crop-that are outside the realm the EPA chooses to
regulate. Compare Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, 79 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. 2002) (finding no
preemption) with Etcheverry, 993 P.2d 366 (finding preemption).
64. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
65. See generallyMichael D. Green, Cipollone Revisited: A Note So Little Secret About the
Scope of Cigarette Preemption, 82 IowA L. REv. 1257 (1997) (examining Cipollone and its
implications); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Products Liability-Cigarettesand Cipollone: What s
Left? What's Gone?, 53 LA. L. REV. 713 (1993) (explaining Cipollone and discussing its
ramifications); Jeffrey R. Steen, Note, Preemption Doctrine and the Failureof Textualism in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 80 VA. L. REv. 979 (1994) (summarizing the court's reasoning and
discussing the benefits of employing extra textual sources in statutory interpretation as opposed
to the Court's strict textualism).
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marketing; breach of express warranties in advertising; fraudulent
misrepresentation of the hazards of smoking; and conspiracy to defraud by
depriving the public of medical and scientific information on smoking."
At issue in Cipollone was the preemptive effect of two cigarette labeling
statutes. The preemption clause in the 1965 Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act (the "1965 Act") provided, "No statement relating to smoking and health"
other than that required by the Act "shall be required" on cigarette packages or
in advertising. 67 In 1969, Congress amended the 1965 Act in the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (the "1969 Act") to make the labeling
requirements more stringent, to ban electronic cigarette advertising, and to
modify the preemption provision to read:
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter.6"
Prior to Cipollone,the Supreme Courtjustices, and hence the lower courts, had
been badly split on the role of both express and implied preemption in barring
common-law claims. 69 Even in cigarette warnings cases, most pre-Cipollone
decisions had rejected express preemption claims in favor of implied
preemption.7 ' Turning that approach on its head, Cipollone ruled that, where
express
Congress speaks expressly to the preemption issue, a largely textual
71
preemption analysis-not implied preemption--should control.
The Court held that the narrower 1965 Act did not preempt state-law
damages actions but that the broader 1969 Act-which barred not simply
"'statement[s]' but rather 'requirement[s] or prohibition[s] ... imposed under
State law"-barred at least some products liability claims because it imposed
stiffer requirements on cigarette manufacturers in exchange for explicit
limitations on rights to sue. 72 Reasoning that a products liability claim should

66. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508-10.
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).

68. Id. at § 1334(b). See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 514-15.
69. See generally Davis, supra note 2 (tracing the history of preemption cases).
70. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508 n.2.
71. "When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted
legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a
'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,' 'there is no need to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions' of the legislation."
Id. at 517 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 520.
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be considered a "requirement" or "prohibition" under the Act,73 and that the
plaintiff's inadequate warnings claim effectively asserted that the
manufacturers' "post-1969 advertising or promotions should have included
additional, or more clearly stated, warnings,"74 the Court concluded that the
1969 Act preempted the plaintiff's warnings claim. 75 However, that Act did not
preempt claims forfraud,or conspiracyto defraud-whichwere not predicated
upon "a duty 'based on smoking and health' but rather on a more general
obligation-the duty not to deceive,' 76 nor those based upon expresswarranty,
because "the 'requirement[s]' imposed by an express warranty claim are not
'imposed under State law,' but rather imposed by the warrantor.,77 Concurring
and dissenting, Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter reasoned that the 1969
Act did not speak clearly enough to deny the petitioner's common-law claims,
while Justices Scalia and Thomas asserted that the 1965 Act preempted the
warnings claims and the 1969 Act barred them all. 79 Although the justices thus
were widely split, Cipollone appears to put to rest most preemption issues in
cigarette litigation.
IV. THE POST-CIPOLLONEEXPERIENCE

A. Motor Vehicles-Myrick and Geier
1. Anti-Lock Braking Systems in Trucks
After Cipollone,the next Supreme Court case to address preemption in the
products liability context was FreightlinerCorp. v. Myrick ° which concerned
the preemptive effect of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
19661 and safety standards issued by its corresponding regulatory agency, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Congress enacted
the Safety Act to regulate the safety of motor vehicles in an effort to reduce the

73. In rejecting petitioner's argument that the 1969 Act's preemption provision did not reach
common-law actions, the Court observed that "[t]he phrase '[n]o requirement or prohibition'
sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law." Id.
at 521 (citations omitted).
74. Id.
75. This is the accepted interpretation of Cipollone.But see Michael D. Green, Cipollone
Revisited: A Not So LittleSecretAbout the Scope of CigarettePreemption,82 IOWAL. REv. 1257
(1997) (arguing that claims asserting inadequate warnings on cigarette packages are not
preempted under Cipollone).

76. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-29.
77. Id. at 525. Nor does the Act preempt claims "that rely solely on respondents' testing or
research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion." Id. at 524-25.
78. Id. at 531-44.
79. Id. at 544-56.
80. 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (1966) (recodified at49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994)).
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toll of injuries and deaths from traffic accidents.82 The Safety Act's preemption
clause prohibits the states from maintaining "motor vehicle safety standards"
that are not identical to any federal standards "in effect. ' 83 The Act also
contains a savings clause, which provides: "Compliance with any Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law."84
In 1970, NHTSA's predecessor agency issued Standard 121, which
imposed certain stopping distances for trucks that could be achieved only if
trucks were equipped with anti-lock braking systems (ABS). Various truck
manufacturers challenged Standard 121, and the Ninth Circuit suspended it
pending further study. Myrick involved design defect claims by plaintiffs who
attributed their injuries to the absence of ABS in eighteen-wheel trucks.
Notwithstanding the fact that Standard 121 had been previously suspended, the
district court ruled that the plaintiffs' design defect claims were preempted by
federal Standard 121 and the Safety Act. 5 The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs' claims were not expressly preempted, nor were they
impliedly preempted because of "Cipollone'sclear instruction that when there
is an express pre-emption provision we should not consider implied preemption.""
The Supreme Court affirmed. 7 Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice
Thomas reasoned that express preemption could not apply because no federal
safety standard was "in effect" as required by the Safety Act's preemption
clause. Nor were plaintiffs' design defect claims impliedly preempted because
there was no conflict with the Act. Thus, because there was no federal standard
with which the plaintiffs' products liability claims could conflict, Myrick may
be viewed as a "false preemption" case. Myrick's importance lies not in its
holding, but in its dictum which resurrects and applies the doctrine of implied
preemption to federal statutes containing express preemption clauses. Rejecting
the court of appeals' interpretation of Cipollone "that implied pre-emption
cannot exist when Congress has chosen to include an express pre-emption
clause in a statute,"8 8 the Court inscrutably observed: "At best, Cipollone
supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied
pre-emption; it does not establish a rule."8'9

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at § 1381 (codified as amended at49 U.S.C. § 30101).
Id. at § 1392(d) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1)).
Id. at § 1397(c) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e)).
Myrick, 514 U.S. at 293.
Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516, 1522 (1 th Cir. 1994).
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 289.
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2. Airbags
Five years after Myrick, the Supreme Court tackled the preemption issue
in another motor vehicle safety case, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,9"
which involved the preemptive effect of certain NHTSA regulations on the use
of airbags in passenger cars. 9 Geierrevealed the latent strength and resilience
of the implied preemption doctrine that Myrick had suggested.
Geier involved the preemptive effect of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 20892 (entitled "Occupant Crash Protection"), a NHTSA regulation
pertaining to airbags and other passive restraints.93 From its initial formulation
in 1967, when it required only lapbelts, Standard 208 has evolved in fits and
starts.94 Beginning in 1975, Standard 208 began to offer manufacturers an
evolving menu of passive restraint options, including airbags or various
combinations of passive restraints, shoulder harnesses, lapbelts, and warning
systems. It was not until 1997 that NHTSA finally mandated dual front-seat
airbags in all passenger cars. 95 Beginning in the late 1980s, an increasing
number of automotive products liability claims were based on the failure of
manufacturers to equip their cars with airbags during this transitional period,
before NHTSA required such devices in all cars. The courts were divided on
the preemption issue; many state courts ruled that such airbag claims were not
preempted96 while all the federal circuit courts ruled that such claims were.97

90. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
91. See Stephen R. Bough & Lynn R. Johnson, Crossing the CenterLine: Preemption in
Automobile ProductLiability Cases, 57 J. Mo. B., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 30; Stephen D. Lichtenstein
& Gerald R. Ferrera, Airbag ProductsLiabilityLitigation: State Common Law Tort Claims Are
Not Automatically Preempted by FederalLegislation, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1 (1997); Ralph
Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liabilityand Compliancewith FederalStandards,
64 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 415 (1996); Raeker-Jordan, Pre-EmptionPresumption,supranote 2, at
1445-68; John F. McCauley, Note, Cipollone and Myrick: Deflating the Airbag Preemption
Defense, 30 IND. L. REv. 827 (1997); Dana P. Bobb, Note, The Deployment of Car
Manufacturers Into a Sea of Product Liability? RecharacterizingPreemption as a Federal
Regulatory Compliance Defense in Airbag Litigation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1677 (1997).
92. Hereinafter "Standard 208" or "FMVSS 208."
93. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2000).
94. See Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 851 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C. Cit. 1988) ("Passive restraint
regulation (Standard 208) has advanced over the years along a protracted, winding, sometimes
perilous course."). Standard 208's history is chronicled in Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo, 884
P.2d 183, 184-85 (Ariz. 1994), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 34-38 (1983).
95. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208.S4.1.5.3 (2000).
96. See, e.g., Munroe v. Galati, 938 P.2d 1114 (Ariz. 1997); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d
327 (id. 1995); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345 (N.H. 1995); Drattel v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 699 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 1998); Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 684 N.E.2d 648 (Ohio
1997).
97. See, e.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir. 1997) (express preemption);
Montag v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996) (implied preemption); Pokorny
v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Taylor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 875 F.2d
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The plaintiffs in Geier claimed that the driver's injuries were aggravated
by a design defect in their 1987 Honda Accord because it was not equipped
with a driver's-side airbag.98 Honda argued that such an airbag claim was
preempted by Standard 208 which, during the transitional period, permitted
manufacturers to choose between seatbelts and airbags.99 The district court
granted summary judgment for Honda, ruling that the plaintiffs' no-airbag
claims were expressly preempted, and the court of appeals affmned on the basis
that such claims were impliedly preempted because they conflicted with the
objectives of federal Standard

2 0 8 ."o

The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the court of appeals that "noairbag" claims are impliedly preempted because they conflict with Standard
208.'0' The Court again was badly split, and Justice Breyer spoke for the fivejudge majority which reasoned from "three subsidiary questions:"
First, does the Act's express pre-emption provision pre-empt
this lawsuit? [No.] Second, do ordinary [implied] pre-emption
principles nonetheless apply? [Yes.] Third, does this lawsuit
actually conflict with FMVSS 208, hence with the Act itself?
02
[Yes.]1
The Safety Act did not expressly preempt products liability claims, the Court
reasoned, because the savings clause suggests that Congress believed that there
were common-law claims that needed to be saved. For this reason, the Court
narrowly construed the phrase "safety standard" in the express preemption
clause to exclude common-law claims."0 3 But the savings clause does not reach
further, thought the majority, to foreclose the operation of implied preemption
where common-law claims actually conflict with a statute or regulation." 4

816 (11 th Cir. 1989) (same); Wood V.Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988) (same).
98. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
99. Id.
100. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
101. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866 (2000).
102. Id. at 867.
103. Id. at 867-68.
104. Id. at 869-70. Applying Geier, courts have since focused on whether the claimed
defect actually conflicts with a relevant FMVSS. See, e.g., Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 222 F.
Supp. 2d 845 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (finding actual conflict with FMVSS 208 and preemption of claim
that airbag warning should have included language beyond that required by FMVSS 208);
Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 97-469, 2003 WL 437160 (Okla. Feb. 25, 2003) (finding
no conflict with FMVSS 208 and no preemption of claim that an airbag that was installed was
defectively designed). See also Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Gentry, 564 S.E.2d 733 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) (finding no conflict with FMVSS 208 and no preemption of claim that seatbelt system was
defectively designed by the improper placement and angle of the shoulder strap and placement of
the knee bolster); Mejia v. White GMC Trucks, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 345 (1l. App. Ct. 2002) (finding
actual conflict with relevant standard and preemption of design defect claim based on design of
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Because the plaintiffs alleged that the car was defectively designed because the
manufacturerfailedto equip it with an airbag, while the Safety Act permitted
manufacturers at the time to choose between airbags and alternative passive
restraints, the no-airbag claims actually conflicted with the federal standard and
so were impliedly preempted."'
B. Food, Drugs, Cosmetics, and Medical Devices-Medtronic and
Buckman
1. Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the preparation and
labeling of food,"° drugs, and cosmetics under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA). 10 7 Because the FDCA does not contain a preemption clause
relevant to drugs, the statute itself does not expressly preempt defective
warning and other products liability claims against pharmaceutical
manufacturers.' Nor, in general, have courts found that the FDCA impliedly
preempts products liability claims against manufacturers of prescription

doors and door handles ofgarbage truck); Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Estate of Wells, 52 S.W.3d
737 (Tex. 2001) (finding no conflict with FMVSS 108 and no preemption of claim that tractortrailer was defectively designed for failing to have lighting in addition to lighting required by
FMVSS 108).
105. Geier,529 U.S. at 874-75, 881. "Because the rule of law for which petitioners contend
would have stood 'as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the important meansrelated federal objectives that we have just discussed, it is pre-empted." Id. at 881. A number of
courts have applied Geier to likewise hold that claims based on the failure to equip a car with
lapbelts or passenger side airbags are preempted under FMVSS 208. See, e.g., Griffith v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 303 F.3d 1276 (11 th Cir. 2002) (applying preemption in the context of a lapbelt);
Nelson v. Ford Motor Co., 761 N.E.2d 1099 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)(finding preemption in the
context of a passenger-side airbag).
106. In Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act and its regulations impliedly preempt inconsistent state food
labeling regulations. See also Boulahanis v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc., 583 N.W.2d 509 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1998) (ruling that a claim for illness from E. Coli bacteria was preempted by the Federal
Meat Inspection Act).
107. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
108. See Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 2002 WL 181972, at *2 (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 28, 2002) ("The portion of the FDCA that is applicable to drugs does not contain a
preemption provision."). On the preemption defense in claims against drug manufacturers, see
OWEN, supra note 2, at § 28:6; Amanda Frost, Judicial Review of FDA Preemption
Determinations, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 367 (1999); David C. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen,
RationalizingProductLiabilityfor PrescriptionDrugs: ImpliedPreemption,FederalCommon
Law, and OtherPaths to Uniform PharmaceuticalSafety Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 395

(1996).
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However, the statute delegates authority to the FDA to preempt state
law,"' and the agency by regulation has expressly preempted state law by
mandating certain warnings for over-the-counter drugs,"' but generally not for
prescription drugs." 2 Because preemption may so emanate from the edict of a
mere administrative agency, a court will not find that an FDA regulation

preempts state law unless the regulation clearly says so."' The courts have
taken the view, as has the FDA itself, ' 4 that FDA drug labeling regulations
generally impose only minimum standards-that these regulatory provisions
provide merely a safety floor-and that state tort law beneficially supplements
federal regulatory efforts to promote drug safety." 5

109. See, e.g., Abbot v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988) (DTP vaccine);
Ohler v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. CIV.A. 01-3061, 2002 WL 88945 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 2002)
(OxyContin); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (S.D. 111.2001) (Parlodel);
MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985) (birth control pills).
110. See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713,721
(1985). Since the FDA is authorized to preempt state law, its failure explicitly to do so "should
be taken as a strong sign that the state action does not threaten national policy and is not impliedly
preempted." TRIBE, supra note 1, § 6-32, at 1213 n. 1.
11. See, e.g., Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72 (Ct. App. 2002)
(describing inadequate warnings claim with respect to head lice treatment); Green v. BDI Pharm.,
803 So. 2d 68 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (addressing failure to warn of addictive nature of Ephedrine
in "Mini Thins"). See also Ohier, 2002 WL 88945, at *12-13 (quoting 63 Fed. Reg.
66382-66384) (concerning direct-to-patient warnings).
112. See Ohler, 2002 WL 88945, at *12.
113. See id. at *13 n.34.
114. See id. (warnings claim related to prescription pain medication, OxyContin); Caraker,
172 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (quoting FDA's recognition of tort litigation's value and desire not to
impede it). The FDA may have changed its position to favor preemption. See James Dabney
Miller, "Failureto Warn '--Blocking Bad Claims, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at 31 (asserting
that FDA has filed amicus brief in Ninth Circuit arguing that FDA approval of labeling for
prescription drug should preempt failure-to-warn claims against manufacturer of drug).
115. See. e.g., Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 2002 WL 181972, at
*3 (S.D. Ind. Jan' 28, 2002); Caraker,172 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 ("Because there is no evidence
that either Congress or the FDA intended on scraping state products liability claims based on a
failure to warn..., it is reasonable to find that the FDA has imposed a minimum-as opposed
to conclusive-standard of safety."); Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(Zolofi; court observed that manufacturer was unable to cite a single decision holding that FDA
prescription drug requirements preempted state-law claims); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v.
Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 828 (D.C. 1994) (Bendectin).
One aberrant trial court decision concluded that FDA labeling requirements for the drug
Adderall preempted a failure to warn claim, reasoning that the FDA prohibited the manufacturer
from changing the FDA-approved warning without prior FDA approval, "except in limited
circumstances for a limited period of time." See Elis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d
1189, 1198 (D.N.D. 2002). The court did not address the relevant regulations which indicate that
manufacturers may strengthen their drug warnings without prior FDA approval, that the FDA
encourages manufacturers to take such initiatives on their own, and that the FDA Commissioner
has memorialized the FDA's view that manufacturers may be under a state-law duty to do so. See
Caraker,172 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (extensive discussion of FDA's views on preemption and history
of 1965 amendment to FDA regulations that allows supplemental warnings without prior FDA
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2. Medical Devices
Prior to the mid-1970s, the FDA possessed limited regulatory power over
manufacturers of medical devices." 6 In response to a number of safety
problems with various medical devices during the early 1970s-including an
IUD called the Dalkon Shield, catheters, artificial heart valves, defibrillators,
and pacemakers--Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 1976
(the MDA) to the FDCA, directing the FDA to classify and regulate the safety
and effectiveness of medical devices. 7 The FDA divides medical devices
among three categories depending on the potential health and safety implications of the device: Class I devices, such as tongue depressors and stethoscopes, contain minimal risk and are subject to minimal regulation; Class II
devices, such as hearing aids and tampons, are potentially more harmful and so
are subject to "special controls;" Class III devices, such as pacemakers and
artificial hearts, pose considerable potential risk and thus are subject to
substantial regulatory control." 8
Prior to marketing a new Class Ill device, the manufacturer must submit
the device to a rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive "premarket approval"
(PMA) process in order to assure the FDA that the device is safe and effective
and, so, proper for sale. Congress provided two exemptions to the premarket
approval process: (1) a "grandfathering" exemption for devices marketed prior
to the 1976 enactment of the MDA, until such time as the FDA initiates and
completes the requisite PMA; and (2) an exemption for post-1976 devices that
are "substantially equivalent" to pre-1976 devices, in order to prevent
manufacturers of the grandfathered devices from obtaining an unfair
competitive advantage over manufacturers of new devices, and to facilitate
improvements to the designs of existing devices. Prior to marketing an
exempted device under this second exemption, a manufacturer must submit a
premarket notification to the FDA" 9 to permit the agency to determine the new
device's "substantial equivalence" to an existing device. Quite simple and
inexpensive, the "premarket notification" (or "§ 510(k)") process usually
results in prompt FDA approval of the new device.
Unlike the FDCA's non-preemptive approach to regulating prescription
drugs, the MDA expressly preempts inconsistent state law, providing that the
states may not enforce any requirement for a medical device which is "different
from or in addition to" any federal requirement "applicable . . . to the

approval).
116. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475-80 (1996) (detailing the history of
medical device regulation and FDA safety controls under MDA).
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2000).
118. See Fowler v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., No. 97-1380-CIV-J-IOB, 1999 WL
1132967, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 1999).
119. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000).
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device."' 20 The FDA has interpreted this provision to mean that state requirements are preempted only if the FDA has a "specific" counterpart regulation or
requirement, thereby rendering any divergent state requirements "different from
or in addition to" the specific FDA requirements. 2 '
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,'22 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's
pacemaker, which the FDA had approved under the substantial-equivalence
§ 510(k) process, failed due to a defectively designed and manufactured wire
lead.23 and that the manufacturer failed to warn of this risk despite knowing of
earlier failures. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the
MDA preempted all of the plaintiffs' claims, and the court of appeals reversed
in part, ruling that the design defect claims were preempted but that the
manufacturing and warning defect claims were not.
The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that the MDA did not
preempt any of the plaintiffs' products liability claims. Applying an express
preemption analysis, the Medtronic Court reasoned that, for a state safety
requirement to be "different from, or in addition to" a corresponding FDA
regulation, the federal regulation would have to be "specific" to the device, not
a regulation of general applicability. 24 With respect to the plaintiffs' design
defect claims, the Court ruled that the FDA did not impose any specific design
safety "requirements" by its cursory § 510(k) determination that the defendant's
product was a "substantially equivalent" device. 2 As for the defective
manufacturing and warnings claims, the Court reasoned that both the FDA's
general "Good Manufacturing Practices" regulations, as well as its general
labeling regulations that required manufacturers of almost every device to
provide warnings appropriate to the device, were simply too general to be either
"applicable to the device," as required in the preemption clause, or "specific"
to a "particular device," as required by the FDA's interpretation of that
clause.' 26
Consistent with Medtronic's holding that generalized FDA safety
regulations are not preemptive, lower courts have ruled that state-law products
liability claims are indeed preempted where the FDA's regulations are exacting

120. Id. at § 360k(a)(1).
121. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2001).
122. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
123. The lead carries the current into the heart muscle. See Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254
F.3d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 2001).
124. Id. at 500.
125. Medtronic,518 U.S. at 492-94.
126. Id. at 497-502. Nor were the plaintiffs' claims based on a violation of FDA regulations
preempted because the preemption clause precluded safety requirements that are "different from,"
not identical to, the federal standards. Id. at 494-97.
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or specific to a particular product.'27 For example, in a case involving a
8
pacemaker that was an investigational device, a context where the FDA
imposes quite exacting standards, 2 9 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the FDA's specific approval of the product's design was preemptive
because a state-law design-defect claim "would thwart the [federal] goals of
safety and innovation."' 30 So, too, because the FDA labeling requirement for

tampons (Class II devices) are specific to tampons, the Ninth Circuit has ruled
that this "device-and-disease-specific" requirement accordingly preempts a
products liability claim."' Medtronic does not directly address the preemption
issue with respect to medical devices approved under the rigorous PMA
process. A number of lower courts have found products liability claims
33
32
concerning such devices to be preempted,' while other courts have not.
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided a quite different medical device

34
preemption case, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'LegalCommittee. In the mid-

1980s, the FDA rejected a § 510(k) substantial equivalency application by the
Acromed Corporation for a variable screw spinal plate fixation system for use
in spinal surgery, determining that the device was a Class III device that was
not substantially equivalent to any other device. Acromed hired a regulatory

127. Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785,795 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("Most courts
of appeal have interpreted Lohr to mean that the MDA preempts common-law claims to the extent
that they interfere or conflict with specific federal requirements.").
128. The MDA exempts investigational devices from the PMA process "to encourage, to
the extent consistent with the protection of the public health and safety and with ethical standards,
the discovery and development ofuseful devices intended for human use." 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(l)
(2000).
129. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 812.20, 812.25 (2003).
130. Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1099 (6th Cir. 1997). See also
Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 109 F.3d 1243, 1248 (7th Cir. 1997) ("(T]hese claims are
preempted by the MDA because they impose requirements ... that are different from or greater
than FDA requirements."). But see Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 713 A.2d 1019, 1030 (N.J. 1998)
("Our reading of Medtronic and the proposed FDA regulations leads us to conclude that the
United States Supreme Court, Congress, and the FDA do not intend that claims such as plaintiff's
should be preempted.").
131. Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737,740 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving tampon-caused
toxic shock syndrome; failure to warn and design defect claim based on consumer expectations
preempted by labeling requirements). Accord, Murphy v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 176 F.
Supp. 2d 473 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that where a tampon caused toxic shock syndrome a failure
to warn claim was preempted by tampon-specific labeling requirements but not a defective design
claim that the tampon was made of highly absorbent viscose rayon).
132. See, e.g., Brooks, 273 F.3d at 799; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 226 (6th
Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 913 (7th Cir. 1997); Fry v. Allergan Med.
Optics, 695 A.2d 511,517 (R.I. 1997); Green v. Dolsky, 685 A.2d 110, 117 (Pa. 1996).
133. See, e.g., Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1382 (11th Cir. 1999); Woods
v. Gliatech, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 802,806-07,811 (W.D. Va. 2002) (citing split of authority, but
ultimately finding no preemption); Haidak v. Collagen Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D. Mass. 1999);
Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Il1. 1999).
134. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
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consultant, the Buckman Company, to refile the application which the FDA
again rejected. Acromed and Buckman then split the device in two and filed
two new § 510(k) applications, one for the bone plates and one for the bone
screws, and changed the intended use from the spine to the long bones of the
arms and legs. Finding that the devices, when applied to these uses, met the test
of substantial equivalence, the
FDA approved the bone-plate and bone-screw
35
devices for these purposes.
Once Acromed marketed the bone-plate and bone-screw devices, surgeons
widely began to use the devices for spinal surgery; thousands of persons
eventually were injured from the implantation of orthopedic bone screws into
the pedicles of their spines. During the 1990s, thousands of suits were filed,
many of which were consolidated for pre-trial proceedings in the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 36 Many of the claims against Acromed
and Buckman, styled "fraud on the FDA," alleged that the defendants
fraudulently misrepresented the product's intended use to the FDA by seeking
agency 'approval of its VSP plates and screws for use in long bones simply as
a pretext in order to market the device for its true intended use in the spine. "",3
The district court dismissed the fraud-on-the-FDA claims as preempted by the
MDA, but the court of appeals reversed, ruling in a split decision that the
claims were not preempted.'3 8
Reversing, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-FDA
claims were impliedly preempted because they conflicted with federal law.'39
There was no "presumption against the preemption" of state-law claims,
reasoned the Court, because "[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly
'a field which the States have traditionally occupied.""' The state-law claims
conflicted with federal law since "the federal statutory scheme amply empowers
the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Administration, and... this
authority is used by the Administration to achieve a somewhat delicate balance
of statutory objectives."'' Because the FDCA expressly approves "off-label"
use of medical devices by medical practitioners, "the FDA is charged with the
difficult task of regulating the [safety] ... of medical devices without intruding
upon decisions statutorily committed to the discretion of health care

135. Id. at 346.
136. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 818 (3d Cir.
1998).
137. Id. at 820.

138. Id. at 829.
139. The Court in Buckman reiterated the point it made in Geierv. American HondaMotor
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000), that the presence in a federal statute of an express preemption
clause in no wayprecludes the operation ofimplied ("ordinary") preemption principles. Buckman,
531 U.S. at 352.
140. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347.
141. Id. at 348.
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professionals."' 42 The Court reasoned that fraud-on-the-FDA claims would
interfere with the FDA's judgment on how best to achieve a sensitive balance
between policing fraud without discouraging § 510(k) applications for "devices
with potentially beneficial off-label uses for fear that such use might expose the
or its associates [such as Buckman] to unpredictable civil
manufacturer
' 43
liability.'
Buckman left unresolved the question whether the MDA impliedly
preempts normal products liability claims-those grounded solely on state tort
or warranty law rather than on a violation of federal law. Although the Court
in its earlier Medtronic decision had only ruled on express preemption, the
Court in Buckman distinguished Medtronic on the ground that "the Medtronic
claims arose from the manufacturer's alleged failure to use reasonable care in
the production of the product, not solely from the violation of FDCA
requirements."' 44 The Court thus observed that Medtronic might be read to
shelter from implied-preemption attack state-law claims that parallel federal
safety regulations. 4 5 So reasoning, several courts have held that Buckman
should be read to allow traditional products liability claims, even fraud claims
that are based on a manufacturer's misrepresentations to the plaintiffrather than
to the FDA.'14
C. RecreationalBoats-Sprietsma
In an effort to stem an increasing number of boat-related injuries and
47
fatalities, Congress enacted the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) to
establish "a coordinated national boating safety program."'" The FBSA gives
the Coast Guard authority to promulgate safety standards for boating equipment
and recreational boats, thereby creating a uniform safety regulatory scheme to
guide manufacturers in designing such equipment. 149 Before issuing a boatsafety regulation, the Coast Guard is required to consult with the National

142. Id. at 350.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 352.
145. Id. at 353.
146. See, e.g., Evev. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. IP98-1429-C-Y/S, 2002 WL 181972 (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 28, 2002) (citing other cases). See also Dawson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d
565, 572-73 (D.N.J. 2001) ("Buckman thus clarified that traditional state tort law claims... are
Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp.
");
not necessarily preempted by the FDCA ....
2001) (holding that Buckman did not alter wealth of authority holding
2d 1018, 1040 (S.D. Ill.
that FDA regulations do not impliedly preempt state-law claims).
147. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000).
148. S.REP. No. 92-248, at 1333 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333.
149. S.REP. No. 92-248, at 1333-35. Regulatory authority was delegated by the Secretary
of Transportation to the Coast Guard. 49 C.F.R. § 1.46(n) (2002).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss2/8

24

2003]

Owen: Federal
Preemption
of Products
LiabilityCLAIMS
Claims
FEDERAL
PREEMPTION
OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY

435

Boating Safety Advisory Council (the Advisory Council) to help determine
whether the regulation is appropriate.' 50
A recurring safety problem in recreational boating is the risk to swimmers
and persons falling from boats of being struck by the rapidly moving propeller
blades on boat motors. Addressing this risk, the Coast Guard in 1988 decided
to investigate the possibility of requiring manufacturers to install propeller
guards to minimize the propeller danger to persons in the water.15' The Coast
Guard directed the Advisory Council to study the data, feasibility, advantages,
and disadvantages of minimizing propeller-strike injuries with propeller guards.
After holding public hearings and studying the issue, the Propeller Guard
Subcommittee unanimously determined that the Coast Guard should notrequire
propeller guards for reasons of safety, economics, and feasibility.' 2 The
Advisory Committee adopted the Subcommittee report and recommended to the
Coast Guard that manufacturers not be required to install propeller guards, and
the Coast Guard adopted the Advisory Committee recommendation in 1990.153
The FBSA contains both a preemption clause and a savings clause. The
preemption clause prohibits state laws and regulations that are not identical to
federal regulations promulgated under the Act." The savings clause provides
that "[c]ompliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders
prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common
law or under State law."' 55
During the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of "no-propeller-guard"
claims were asserted against manufacturers of boats and motors for failing to
equip boat motors with propeller guards. A large majority of courts, but not
all,'5 6 held that the FBSA preempted such claims-most on the basis of express

150. 46 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(4) (2000).
151. See generallyAmy P. Chiang, Note, The FederalBoat Safety Act of 1971 and Propeller Strike Injuries: An Unexpected Exercise in FederalPreemption, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 487,
494-97 (1999) (discussing preemption of propeller strike injuries).
152. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 757 N.E.2d 75, 78-79 (I. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S.
51 (2002). The Subcommittee found that propeller guards tend to hinder steering, increase the risk
of blunt contact with persons in the water, and create a risk that a person's arm or leg could be
"caught between the guard and the propeller blades." Id. at 78.
153. Id. at 78-79.
154. "Unless permitted by the Secretary..., a State... may not establish, continue in
effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel... safety standard... that
is not identical to a regulation prescribed under section 4302 of this title." 46 U.S.C. § 4306

(2000).
155. See, e.g., id.§ 4311(g).
156. See, e.g., Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming the
presumption against preemption in the context of a waterskier); Moore v. Brunswick Bowling &
Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Tex. 1994) (recognizing that its "holding conflicts with
the four courts that have considered" similar actions).
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preemption,' 57 but several, influenced by the savings clause, on implied conflict
preemption grounds.' On both bases, many courts concluded that the Coast
Guard's deliberative decision not to require propeller guards was preemptive
of no-propeller-guard claims which effectively would require manufacturers to
install such guards-a state "requirement" not "identical" to the federal
requirement,' 59 indeed, "in direct contravention to the Coast Guard's policy
against mandating such a device in favor of affording manufacturers flexibility
in the matter."' 6
In Sprietsma v. MercuryMarine,6 ' the plaintiff s wife fell from a boat and
was killed when struck by the motor's propeller blades. The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer ofthe motor, claiming that it was unreasonably dangerous for not
being equipped with a propeller guard.'62 The trial court held that the claims
were impliedly preempted by the FBSA; the appellate court affirmed on the
basis of express preemption; and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, ruling
that the plaintiff's claims conflicted with the Coast Guard's no-propeller-guard
1 63
decision and so were barred on implied preemption grounds. Reversing, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that the Boat Safety Act neither expressly nor
implicitly preempted the plaintiffs common-law products liability claims.'6
The Court reasoned that, first, the Act's express preemption clause, which
referred to "a" state "law or regulation," appeared to preempt only a state's
positive regulatory law, not common-law compensation claims, particularly in
view of the savings clause provision that compliance with the Act "does not
165
relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law." Nor was

157. See, e.g., Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding express
preemption in the context of a passenger falling from a boat and being struck by a propeller);
Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (finding express
preemption in similar situation involving emotional distress claim by other passenger); Shield v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1993) (finding express preemption); Ryan v.
Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1997) (finding express preemption in the context of
a swimmer struck by a propeller).
158. See, e.g., Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding
implied preemption in the context of ajet skier colliding with a boat); Lewis v. Brunswick Corp.,
107 F.3d 1494 (11 th Cir. 1997) (finding implied preemption where plaintiff was thrown from a
boat); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 757 N.E.2d 75, 78-79 (Ill. 2001), rev'd,537 U.S. 51 (2002)
(finding implied preemption in the context of a fall from a boat).
159. See, e.g., Carstensen, 49 F.3d at 432 (express preemption).
160. See, e.g., Lady, 228 F.3d at 614. Courts have found not preempted (and hence allowed)
other types of claims against boat manufacturers based on unsafe features that the Coast Guard
has not addressed. See, e.g., LaPlante v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196 (Ct. App.
2001) (finding that "the negligent installation of hand held devices... [is] not preempted by the
FBSA").
161. 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
162. Id. at 55.
163. Sprietsma, 757 N.E.2d at 77, 86, rev'd, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
164. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. 51.
165. Id. at 63.
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the plaintiff's claim impliedly preempted by conflict or field preemption
principles. 66 The plaintiffs products liability claim did not conflict with the
Coast Guard's decision not to require propeller guards in view of the Coast
Guard's policy of leaving state-law regulations in place unless and until 67
it
adopted a conflicting regulation under the Act, which here it had not done.1
Finally, Congress's effort to promote uniformity in boat safety regulation had
to yield to the Act's primary goal of boat safety, a goal served by both the Coast
Guard's policy ofallowing broad state regulation
of boat safety and by products
16
case.
this
in
those
like
claims
liability
D. Other Types ofProducts
The preemption issue has arisen in the lower courts in connection with a
large number of other federal statutes that regulate the safety of many different
types of products, and the diversity of approaches in the decisions reflects the
failure of Congress to speak clearly to this issue together with the confused
evolution of preemption in the Supreme Court. 169 The two most important

166. Id. at 69-70.
167. Id. at 65-66
168. Id. at 69.
169. See, e.g., Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 326 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that
the Locomotive Inspection Act can give rise to conflict preemption but not field preemption);
Choate v. Champion Home Builders Co., 222 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that theNational
Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act does not preempt design defect and
warnings claims based on lack of battery-powered backup in smoke detectors for mobile homes);
Symens v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding the USDA's
regulation of animal vaccines preempts claims of cattle infections); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the FAA does not preempt state law); In re
Wireless Tel. Radio Frequency Emissions Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2003)
(holding that a claim that cellular phones emitted unsafe levels of radiation was impliedly
preempted because the suit would necessarily require both judge and jury to usurp the regulatory
functions that Congress entrusted to the FCC under the Telecommunications Act); King v. Aventis
Pasteur, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1207 (D. Or. 2002) (finding no preemption under the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act); Lucia v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 173
F. Supp. 2d 1253 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (finding no preemption, under the Federal Aviation Act, for
defective crankshafts; distinguishing "complete preemption" doctrine, for assessing federal
removal jurisdiction, from "ordinary preemption," which precludes state-law claims); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Kilgore, 853 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 2002) (finding that the Locomotive Inspection Act
preempts claim based on asbestos exposure from locomotive components because Act occupies
entire field of locomotive equipment and safety); Scheiding v. Gen. Motors Corp., 993 P.2d 996
(Cal. 2000) (finding that the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act preempts state-law actions against
locomotive manufacturers); Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1994) (finding no
preemption under the Hazardous Materials Transporation Act); Schiffner v. Motorola, Inc., 697
N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding the Electronic Product Radiation Control Act did not
preempt claims ofdiminished value from defective cellular phones); Seaman v. A.P. Green Indus.,
707 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding that the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act preempts
the entire field of locomotive safety); Hall v. Fairmont Homes, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (finding that the NMHCSSA does not preempt claims that formaldehyde emission
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categories of products not yet addressed that are subject to safety regulation by
federal agencies are consumer products and workplace products.
1. Consumer Products
Consumer products are regulated by the Consumer Product Safety
70
Commission (CPSC) under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), the
72
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 17' and two other statutes.1 The CPSA
74
173
contains both a preemption clause and a savings clause.' The preemption

defense has arisen only infrequently in consumer products liability litigation.
A couple of decisions involving warnings and design defect claims against
power mower manufacturers have held that the plaintiffs' warnings claims were
preempted because the CPSC had promulgated a specific regulation governing
such warnings, but that the design claims were not, 75 and one court has ruled
that the CPSA preempts all such claims. 176 In several cases involving injuries
from fires caused by children playing with lighters, some courts have found no
preemption, 77 while one court has ruled that the CPSA preempted the design
defect claim but not the warnings claim.'7 And in a case involving injuries

levels violated HUD regulations). See generally Sean S. Kelly, Comment, Federalismin Flight:
Preemption Doctrine and Air CrashLitigation,28 TRANsP. L.J. 107 (2000) (discussing federal

preemption in aviation law).
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2000).
171. Id. §§ 1261-1278.
172. The Federal Flammable Fabrics Act (FFA), id. §§ 1191-1204, and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act (PPPA), id. §§ 1471-1476. Although the FFA does have a preemption clause,
the courts have ruled that a manufacturer's compliance with this statute does not preempt products
liability claims for flammable clothing. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 96
F.3d 552, 553 (1st Cir. 1996); Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir.
1973); O'Donnell v. Big Yank, Inc., 696 A.2d 846, 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
173. The preemption clause provides that, if the CPSC has established federal safety standdards for a product, the states may not adopt a safety standard or regulation "which prescribes any
requirements as to the performance, composition, contents, design, finish, construction,
packaging, or labeling of such product which are designed to deal with the same risk of injury
associated with such consumer product, unless such requirements are identical to the requirements
of the Federal standard." 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (2000).
174. The savings clause provides: "Compliance with consumer product safety rules or other
rules or orders under this chapter shall not relieve any person from liability at common law or
under State statutory law to any other person." Id. § 2074(a).
175. See Moe v. MTD Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1995); Cortez v. MTD Prod., Inc.,
927 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
176. See Frazier v. Heckingers, 96 F. Supp. 2d 486 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
177. See, e.g., Colon v. BIC USA, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Hittle v.
Scripto-Tokai Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 142 (M.D. Pa. 2001); Frith v. BIC Corp., 852 So. 2d 592,
593 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 773 A.2d 802 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001),
appealgranted,790 A.2d 1018 (Pa. 2001).
178. See Ball v. BIC Corp., No. 4:97CV02467, 2000 WL 33312192, at *2-*3 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 8, 2000).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss2/8
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from the shattering of a glass shower door, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
CPSA did not preempt either the design or warnings claims.179
Pursuant to the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), the CPSC
establishes mandatory labeling requirements for certain hazardous substances
intended for household use.18 0 Because the structure and purpose of the FHSA
is similar to the CPSA, the CPSC applies a single preemption regulation to both
acts, interpreting the preemption of state "requirements" to mean statutory and
regulatory requirements, not common-law holdings by the courts.' Although
early decisions found no preemption,'82 courts in recent years have quite
uniformly found that the FHSA preempts warnings claims when the
manufacturer's warning complies with federal requirements,' but that the Act
does not preempt design (or manufacturing defect) claims8 4 or "misbranding"
claims based on violation of FHSA regulations.8 5

179. Leipart v. Guardian Indus., 234 F.3d 1063, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2000).
180. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278 (2000).
181. See Leflar & Adler, supra note 2, at 745 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 3414, 3415 (1991)
(preamble to 16 C.F.R. § 1061)).
182. See, e.g., Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085-86 (D.C. 1976) (finding
no preemption, facts involved explosive floor tile adhesive); Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping
Serv., 306 N.E.2d 312, 316 (ill. App. Ct. 1973) (finding no preemption, facts involved toxic
cleaning agent).
183. See, e.g., Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2001); Comeaux
v. Nat'l Tea Co., 81 F.3d 42 (5th Cir. 1996); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir.
1993); Kirstein v. W.M. Barr & Co., 983 F. Supp. 753, 761 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff'd sub nom.
Kirstein v. Parks Corp., 159 F.3d 1065 (7th Cir. 1998); Pa. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Landis, 96 F. Supp.
2d 408, 414-15 (D.N.J. 2000), aft'd,248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000) (table); West v. Mattel, Inc.,
246 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (involving a child's toy; Child Safety Protection Act
amendment to FHSA preempts claim for inadequate warning of choking hazard, but not design
defect claims); Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 408-09 (Ill. 1996); Schrader v.
Sunnyside Corp., 747 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 2002) (warning on can of denatured alcohol);
Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., 634 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ohio 1994).
184. See Smith & Grage, supra note 1, at 405-09. The Act probably does not preempt
design and manufacturing defect claims that are bona fide, that is, claims that are not merely
warnings claims dressed in sheep's clothing in an attempt to circumvent the Act's preemption of
warnings claims. See generallyArnold v. Dow Chem. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (Ct. App. 2001)
(discussing the issue in FIFRA context); Beadling v. William Bowman Assocs., 809 A.2d 188
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that FHSA did not preempt design defect claim alleging
that government-mandated warning for methanol should have been placed on side of drum rather
than top); Sally Baghdasarian, Recent Case, Arnold v. Dow Chem. Co., 110 Cal.Rptr. 2d 722 (Ct.
App. 2001), 31 Sw. U. L. REV. 441 (2002) (discussing issue in FIFRA context).
185. See, e.g., Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
"a state cause of action alleging non-compliance with the FHSA would not be preempted by the
Act"); Kirstein v. W.M. Barr & Co., 983 F. Supp. 753, 761-64 (N.D. IIl. 1997), affd sub. nom.,
Kirstein v. Parks Corp., 159 F.3d 1065 (7th Cir. 1998); Canty v. Ever-Last Supply Co., 685 A.2d
1365, 1374 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
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2.

Workplace Products

The safety of workplace products is regulated by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA). 81 6 OSHA does not contain an express preemption clause,' 87 but it does
contain a savings clause that seems to make clear that it does not displace state
tort-law claims for injuries.' 88 When the savings clause is considered together
with the fact that OSHA applies only to employers, not manufacturers, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that OSHA does not preempt injury claims
against manufacturers of products in the workplace. 89 Were it not for one
dubious case suggesting a contrary result,19 it would be clear that OSHA has
no preemptive effect on third-party products liability claims by injured workers
against manufacturers of industrial products.
V. CONCLUSION

The ever-shifting law of federal preemption is rife with perplexities. In
attempting to unravel these perplexities, the first thing ajudge or lawyer should
do in any particular case is to determine if the Supreme Court has spoken
definitively on the issue. If the Supreme Court has not done so, one must try to
discern whether the particular products liability claims involved would
contravene either an express preemption clause or the purposes of the particular
act of Congress. Because regulatory objectives (and the phrasing of preemption
and savings clauses) differ among the various federal product safety statutes,
preemption issues normally are resolved by the growing jurisprudence
applicable to the particular statute relevant to the plaintiff's particular products
liability claims.

186. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2000).

187. But the Occupational Safety and Health Administration has adopted certain preemption
regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a), (f)(1) (2003).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2000). "There is a solid consensus that section 4(b)(4) operates
to save state tort rules from preemption." Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 53 (1st Cir.
1991). See also John J. Manna, Jr., Note, The Extent of OSHA Preemption of State Hazard
ReportingRequirements, 88 COLuM.L.REv. 630,641(1988) (framing OSHA's savings clause);
Note, GettingAway With Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State CriminalProsecutions
for IndustrialAccidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535, 543 (1987) (discussing the extent of OSHA

preemption).
189. See Pedraza,942 F.2d at 53 n.6; Cotto v. Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico, No.
AC-2000-76, 2002 WL 1009685, at *12 (P.R. 2002); Wickham v. Am. Tokyo Kasei, Inc., 927
F. Supp. 293,295 (N.D. Ill. 1996); York v. Union Carbide Corp., 586 N.E.2d 861, 866 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992). See also Jones v. Cincinnati, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992)

(discussing OSHA preemption).
190. Torres-Rios v. LPS Labs., Inc., 152 F.3d 11 (1stCir. 1998). See also Smith & Grage,
supra note 1, at 408-09.
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Because product safety is federally regulated to quite a large extent,
widening the reach of the preemption doctrine erases more and more areas of
products liability law. Such a shift toward safety regulation in substitution for
compensating injuries caused by defective products, similar to the conventional
European approach, may make some sense in terms of broad-scale social
engineering. Yet, when courts interpret preemption and savings clauses in
federal statutes that regulate product safety, they should be cautious not to
foreclose unduly the state-law compensatory rights of persons injured by
defective products to judicial remedies'' protected by both federal and state
constitutions. When Congress enacted most of the product safety legislation
during the consumer protection period of the late 1960s and early 1970s, it
probably intended only to preempt state regulatory law, not broadly to
immunize manufacturers from their duties to consumers under state products
liability law.'92 And there is in fact no reason, as a general matter, why product
safety regulation and products liability litigation cannot comfortably co-exist.
Congress, if it wanted, could largely clean up the current "preemption
mess." That is, if Congress truly desired to leave damages actions intact for
persons injured by product hazards subject to federal regulation, it could
explicitly limit the preemptive reach of its product safety statutes to legislative
and regulatory activity while simultaneously providing, in a savings clause, that
damages actions do not conflict with (indeed, may be complementary to)
congressional purpose. Yet, while Congress fairly may be urged to speak
clearly on whether federal legislation is intended to preempt common-law
claims,' 9 it seems quite unrealistic to expect Congress now to amend the
product safety statutes of the 1960s and 1970s to cure the problem. As a
practical matter, there is just no simple route out of the preemption thicket in
which we now are largely lost. In any single case, courts and lawyers must
simply do their best to ascertain whether the language of particular federal
legislation or regulations bearing on a particular product safety issue in fact
appears to bar particular products liability claims and, if not, whether such
claims do or do not reasonably appear to interfere substantially with the
particular statute's goals. In this, it is worth remembering that the key to federal
preemption begins and ends with statutory interpretation, with figuring
congressional intent.

191. See Rabin, supra note 2.
192. See Leflar & Adler, supra note 2, at 746-48.
193. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 2, at 972; Grey, supranote 2, at 617-18; Racker-Jordan,
Pre-EmptionPresumption,supra note 2, at 1381.
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